Showing posts with label world economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label world economy. Show all posts
Saturday, January 16, 2016
Legend Warns Global Stock Market Rout To End In Full-Blown Panic!
On the heels of the Dow plunging more than 500 at one point in the trading day and global markets continuing to get pummeled, today a legend who warned just 8 days ago that the carnage in global markets would continue told King World News that investors should expect to see an acceleration of the global stock market rout that will end in panic.
Eric King: “Bill, people are wondering if we could see a rebound next week?”
Bill Fleckenstein: “Of course there can always be a rebound but I don’t think it will carry very far — in the same way that none of the little rally attempts have carried very far that we’ve had in the past eight or nine sessions…
Global Stock Market Rout To End In Panic
Fleckenstein continues: “So I don’t think the market can rally very well at all and I think there is a much better chance that we will see an acceleration to the downside.
They managed to pull the market back over the August/September lows in the S&P but some of the other indices have already broken through those lows. So I think there is a better chance of an acceleration of the selling. And if there is any kind of a bounce I don’t think it will be very meaningful. I don’t think that the stock market can have any kind of a meaningful bounce until we either get real panic and/or the Fed rides to the rescue.”
Fleckenstein had warned King World News just 8 days ago that there would be more carnage in global markets (see below).
Eric King: “The fantasy is coming to an end but this day had to come, right?”
Bill Fleckenstein: “You’re right, it had to come to an end. One of the hardest things for people who aren’t investment professionals and even for many investment professionals to understand is how something (an investment strategy) that is so clearly destined to work can sort of lie there and not respond and not do what you think it ought to do for as long as this insanity has gone on.
What I’m particularly referring to there is how well and how long the stock market managed to levitate on the back of not much more than outright monetization.
The Gigantic Suspension Of Disbelief
The first couple of years after 2008 there was a snapback after they stopped the carnage with all the programs and government bailouts and money printing. But from 2011 on, when QE3 started, that’s when we really had a gigantic suspension of disbelief. That’s when the vast majority of people really concluded, ‘Gee, these guys really know what they are doing and it’s going to work this time.’ They didn’t stop to think that it was these very same policies that got us into this mess and all we do is keep pursuing the same strategy in a bigger and bolder fashion.
But nonetheless, it’s taken quite some time for the ultimate failure of this fantasy to start to unfold. Now, it’s not the 25 basis points that is breaking the market. They stopped QE 14 months ago and the market kind of went sideways. So the top took about a year to produce on the major averages, but beneath the surface lots of stocks have been weak.
This Has Been A Long Time Coming…
The economic data has been pretty damn poor considering rates have been zero for 7 years and we monetized $3 trillion here in the United States and the same thing is going on in most of the G7 countries. So the economic recovery has been nothing and this has been a long time coming.
But China Is Being Blamed For The Panic
You couldn’t predict when the market break was going to occur but we kind of got some hints of that last year and the way the market has broken in January. Now, people here want to blame this market break on the North Korean hydrogen bomb or the Chinese devaluation and their stock market plunge. But China’s got a misallocated capital and debt problem — that’s we have and that’s what the whole world has. China has a different variation than we do and in some ways they are better than us — in some ways they are worse than us.
This isn’t about China. China is getting blamed because it’s the spark, right? But meanwhile you see that credit spreads are widening, junk bonds have collapsed, the oil patch is a wreck. What do you think is happening to all these insurance companies and pension plans that reached for yield in different credits? And what about the poor bastards from the public who felt they had no choice and felt they had to reach for yield and buy stocks?
The bottom line is that this misallocation of capital has gone on for so long that people look at individuals like Jim Grant, Fred Hickey, or even me, and people would laugh at us. I’ve gotten quite a volume of hate mail where people say, ‘You’re an idiot. Why do you keep saying this stuff?’ Well, you don’t know how long it will take for the chickens to come home to roost, you just know they are going to have to.
There Is No Saving This Market – QE4 Is Coming
So we’re at that moment now, and it’s liable to get quite a bit worse because there is no saving the market. The numbers have been bad, the speculation has been high, and the world economy is getting worse, but the Fed can’t come to the rescue until global stock markets break and break hard. Then we’ll have QE4 and in that phase we will have to see how well the Fed is believed, what they do, and what we think the ramifications will have to be at that time.
The Carnage Will Play Out Faster Than People Think
There’s no guarantee that people are going to believe the central banks because in 2008 they didn’t believe them all year, and in 2001 – 2002 they didn’t believe them. Right now they still seem to have total confidence. So the stock market has been an accident waiting to happen and now the accident is happening, and the carnage is going to play out much quicker than people think.
Having said that, this is going to be a two-step trade, right? The first is going to be the big break in the stock market. Then the Fed is going to do what it’s going to do, and then you’ve got to see what you want to do next.
As It Pertains To Gold And Silver…
As it pertains to the precious metals (phase two of the trade), they have been hated and avoided because nobody thinks they need them when the central banks are in control. So they are basically the flip-side of the confidence trade that’s driven stocks to the moon.
It’s no coincidence that as the market has broken badly at a time of the year when it’s not supposed to, suddenly gold has started to move higher. And what will happen is gold will start to go up and it will finally catch a bid and start behaving better.
Gold will start to trade higher once again on news that used to make it surge and people will come out of the woodwork and try to own it and there will be a gigantic scramble. Has that process started? Most likely it has. It’s also worth noting that some of the miners are finally acting better.
So we are going to see both sides of the trade start to play out at the same time, but they are all different expressions of the same thing. Gold is a way for people to say, ‘These policies are crazy. I know what central banks are going to do and I can own this in order to protect my capital and make money. The stock market only went up because people believed in these idiots and that trade and that belief are now coming to an end.’
So people can express their doubt in what central banks can do by being short stocks or being long gold. I’ve currently got both sides of that trade on. Anyway, I think that’s the longest answer I’ve given to a short question in my career.”
Sunday, November 8, 2015
Governments Control Everything But This Will End In Chaos
With continued volatility in global markets, today one of the top economists in the world sent King World News an incredibly powerful piece warning governments control everything but this will end in chaos. Below is the fantastic piece from Michael Pento.
By Michael Pento of Pento Portfolio Strategies
– U.S. Manufacturing Renaissance Turns Into the Dark Ages
The October ISM Manufacturing Index, which has been the official barometer of the U.S. manufacturing sector since 1915, came in with a reading of just 50.1. This was a level barely above contraction.
Of the 18 industries surveyed in the Regional Manufacturing Survey, 9 reported contraction in October: Apparel, leather & allied products; primary metals; petroleum & coal products; plastics & rubber products; electrical equipment, appliances & components; machinery; transportation equipment; wood products; and computer & electronic products.
Energy Struggles
And of those nine, the energy market in particular continues to struggle the most. One respondent in the survey noted that the effects of the weak energy market are now beginning to bleed into other areas of the economy.
In addition to this, new orders for U.S. factory goods fell for a second straight month in September (down 1.0 %), confirming the manufacturing sector in the United States has hit a downturn. In fact, U.S. factory orders have fallen y/y for 11 of last 14 months; and contracted 6.9% from September 2014.
Furthermore, demand for durable goods fell 1.2% in September. While demand for nondurable goods (goods not expected to last more than three years) fell 0.8%. This placed downward pressure on GDP in the third quarter leading to a disappointing 1.5% GDP read.
During the month of September a majority of U.S. states reported jobs losses, as the slowing manufacturing sector weighed on hiring nationwide. The Labor Department recently announced that 27 states actually lost jobs in the month of September. This data belies the rosy headline 271k Non-Farm Payroll report issued for October: the Labor Department releases individual state data a month in arrears.
Turning Back To The Dark Ages
All this bad news begs the question: Has the former manufacturing renaissance in the United States officially turned back into the dark ages?
Despite huge kudo’s to U.S. ingenuity for inventing fracking and horizontal drilling technologies, the viability of these innovations depends upon an unsustainable bubble in oil prices. Fracking is just one example of the misallocation of capital resulting from faulty price signals derived from central banks’ manipulation of interest rates.
And this failure isn’t limited to our Federal Reserve. The strategies of central banks all over the world are failing.
Problems In Europe And Japan
The European Central Bank (ECB) to date is in the process of printing the equivalent of $67 billion of QE per month, which will amount to a total of $1.2 trillion (or 1.1 trillion euros) by the time Mario Draghi’s QE program is slated to end in September of 2016.
Considering all that money printing, GDP in the Eurozone was only a pathetic 1.2% larger than it was one year ago.
Once the star of the Eurozone economy, German GDP disappointed with growth of 0.4% for the second quarter instead of the 0.5% analysts had been expecting. The French figure came in completely flat, and Italy, the Eurozone’s third biggest economy, disappointed with growth of just 0.2%.
Italy’s unemployment rate managed to fall in September, even as its economy lost 36,000 jobs during the month. This was because more discouraged workers left the workforce. As growth rates languish and economies lose jobs, central banks are getting more and more desperate to create inflation, which they like to masquerade as growth.
But the sad truth is even with over a trillion Euros of new money printed, governments are not achieving the inflation rates or the GDP growth they are seeking.
And then we have Japan, which is entering into its 3rd recession since the Abenomics regime took control in December 2012. The BOJ has been in the habit of printing 80 trillion yen each year! Nevertheless, its debt to GDP is approaching 250%, and annual deficits are 8% of GDP. The BOJ is buying 90% of all the bonds issued, and now owns half of all Japanese ETF’s. Yet despite a train wreck of an economy and horrific debt and deficits the 10 year note—in a perfect example of a central bank distorting economic reality–is yielding just 0.3%.
Our Fed has printed $3.5 trillion since 2008 in a futile attempt to get the economy growing at what Keynesians term as escape velocity. However, we have only averaged 2% growth since 2010. And growth in 2015 appears to be even less, as the all-important manufacturing sector is now clearly in a recession, and is now dragging down the rest of the economy.
Governments Control Everything But This Will End In Chaos
Today, there are no free markets left anywhere in the world. Governments control the fixed income, equity and real estate sectors; and therefore control the entire economy. And what was once touted as the U.S. manufacturing renaissance has morphed into another example of how government’s abrogation of free markets will ultimately result in economic chaos and entropy.
Wednesday, October 14, 2015
THE G-30 GROUP OF CENTRAL BANKERS WARN THEY CAN “NO LONGER SAVE THE WORLD”
“Central banks have described their actions as ‘buying time’ for governments to finally resolve the crisis… But time is wearing on"
by ZERO HEDGE
In a detailed report by the Group of Thirty, central bankers warned that ZIRP and money printing were not sufficient to revive economic growth and risked becoming semi-permanent measures. As Reuters reports, the flow of easy money has inflated asset prices like stocks and housing in many countries but have failed to stimulate economic growth; and with growth estimates trending lower and easy money increasing company leverage, the specter of a debt trap is now haunting advanced economies. “Central banks have described their actions as ‘buying time’ for governments to finally resolve the crisis… But time is wearing on,” sending a message of “you’re on your own” to governments around the world.
The G30 begins their report rather pointedly…
Central banks worked alongside governments to address the unfolding crises during 2007–09, and their actions were a necessary and appropriate crisis management response. But central bank policies alone should not be expected to deliver sustainable economic growth. Such policies must be complemented by other policy measures implemented by governments.
At present, much remains to be done by governments, parliaments, public authorities, and the private sector to tackle policy, economic, and structural weaknesses that originate outside the control or influence of central banks. In order to contribute to sustainable economic growth, the report presumes that all other actors fulfill their responsibilities.
Roughly translated… central bankers are saying “you are now on your own.”
Central banks alone cannot be relied upon to deliver all the policies necessary to achieve macroeconomic goals. Governments must also act and use the policy-making space provided by conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures. Failure to do so would be a serious error and would risk setting the stage for further economic disturbances and imbalances in the future.
And the “need to exit” appears to be front and center for The G30 bankers…
There seems to be an almost unanimous view that monetary policy in the major AMEs will have to be normalized at some point. However, even if views differ about what precisely normal might mean, presumed dates for exit also differ due to different countries being at different points in the business cycle. There is also agreement that a danger exists of exiting too soon, thus aborting a nascent recovery, and also of exiting too late, thus encouraging some combination of higher inflation and other imbalances that could also weigh on recovery.
However, where serious disagreement arises is when it comes to discussing which danger is the greater. Those worried about too early an exit point to the example of the Federal Reserve in 1937. In contrast, those worried about too late an exit point to the inflation that followed the Fed-Treasury Accord in the late 1940s and to the inflationary surge in the early part of the 1970s.
In recent years, distortions in financial markets and the effects on EMEs have also moved much higher up the list of concerns of this latter group.
While reasonable people can disagree on such objective issues, a number of political economy factors seem to make exiting too late the more likely outcome.
First, there is great uncertainty concerning the consequences of tightening.
Second, in some cases it will in fact be clear that tightening will reveal some debts as being unserviceable, and some financial institutions as undercapitalized. Central banks will then be asked to wait until these other sectors have become more robust, which could well take a long time. The danger is that debt levels will rise with the passage of time, strengthening the arguments for still more forbearance—the debt trap discussed above.
Third, debtors will obviously resist the tightening of policy.Since governments are struggling to manage record-high sovereign debt levels, they too will be tempted to put pressure on their central banks to push back tightening as far as possible.
But delaying an ‘exit’ has costs…
Wicksell, Hayek, Koo, Minsky, and others have, over many decades, identified a variety of theoretical concerns arising from the excessive expansion of money and credit during booms. Rising inflation, investment misallocations, balance sheet overhangs, banking sector instability, and volatile international capital flows were all highlighted as threats to future economic stability. Moreover, by 2007 it was evident that these were matters of practical concern as well.
The policies followed by the major central banks since 2008, while contributing to stability in the short run and conceivably avoiding a second great depression, might also have aggravated threats to future stability. These policies have had undesirable macroeconomic side effects both in the AMEs themselves and in EMEs. Admittedly, in the latter case, the policy responses of the EMEs themselves to inflows of foreign capital have also played a contributing role.
“Capital losses would affect many investors, including banks, and the process of extend and pretend for poor loans would have to come to a stop,” the G30 report said.
With the consequences of an exit from easy money so unpredictable, the G30 said the risk was of exiting too late for fear of sparking another crisis.
And so, while ‘exit’ is seen as urgent, it is unlikely…
“Faced with uncertainty, the natural default position is the status quo,” the G30 said.
In other words more of the same… and while The G30 are careful to note the glass-half-full persepctive of the future, their “endgame” scenario of continuing weak (or even weaker) growth is troubling…
Should the global economy stay weak, or indeed should it weaken again as financial markets overshoot, we could face the possibility of debt deflation. The almost 40 percent decline in commodity prices since mid-2014 could be a precursor of such a slowdown. In this environment, risk-free rates would stay very low and there would be no exit for monetary policy.
Nevertheless, the current prices of many other financial assets would be revealed as excessive. Capital losses would affect many investors, including banks, and the process of extend and pretend for poor loans would have to come to a stop. In this scenario, for all the political economy arguments presented above, attempts might nevertheless be made to rely on monetary policy to restore demand. However, just as past efforts have failed to gain traction, renewed efforts would likely have a similar outcome. This would be particularly likely if the overhang of debt had worsened in the interval as has indeed happened over the last few years.
In such circumstances, governments would also be faced with chronic revenue shortfalls. This could lead to a worst-case situation where deflation would actually sow the seeds for an uncontrolled inflationary outcome. Governments with both large deficits and large debts must borrow to survive, but worries about debt accumulation might imply an increasing reluctance on the part of the private sector to lend to them at sustainable rates. In that case, recourse to the central bank is inevitable, and hyperinflation often the final result.
And the side effects of central bank policies during the crisis is still more worrying…
Central banks see their actions as buying time for governments to address problems that are essentially real, not monetary. However, governments have thus far not reacted as necessary. Recognizing the political difficulties of addressing these underlying problems, they prefer to believe that central bank actions will be sufficient to restore strong, stable, and balanced growth. Thus, they are strongly tempted to forebear in the pursuit of policies that might be more effective. The longer this standoff persists, the more dangerous it becomes as the undesirable side effects of current central bank policies continue to cumulate.
Which is exactly what Macquarie hinted at… the academics will be the first to note that policy escalation may be required (helicopter money).. and then policy-makers have the ivory tower to lean on when they unleash it.
Finally, The G30 admits – it’s all an illusion…
Central bank policies since the outbreak of the crisis have made a crucial contribution to restoring the appearance of financial stability.
Nevertheless, for this appearance to become a reality, underlying problems rooted in very high debt levels must be resolved if global growth is to be more sustainably restored.
So, the bottom line, reading between the lines of this 80-page report, is that
Central Bankers know their policies have done (and will do) nothing to promote real economic improvements, are putting pressure on governments to do something (anything), admit that is unlikely (because the central bankers have always saved them before), expect extreme policy measures to become the status quo (despite admitting their failure) for fear of any asset weakness, and suggest more measures might be needed (which have led to hyperinflation in the past).
But apart from that – everything is awesome!!
by ZERO HEDGE
In a detailed report by the Group of Thirty, central bankers warned that ZIRP and money printing were not sufficient to revive economic growth and risked becoming semi-permanent measures. As Reuters reports, the flow of easy money has inflated asset prices like stocks and housing in many countries but have failed to stimulate economic growth; and with growth estimates trending lower and easy money increasing company leverage, the specter of a debt trap is now haunting advanced economies. “Central banks have described their actions as ‘buying time’ for governments to finally resolve the crisis… But time is wearing on,” sending a message of “you’re on your own” to governments around the world.
The G30 begins their report rather pointedly…
Central banks worked alongside governments to address the unfolding crises during 2007–09, and their actions were a necessary and appropriate crisis management response. But central bank policies alone should not be expected to deliver sustainable economic growth. Such policies must be complemented by other policy measures implemented by governments.
At present, much remains to be done by governments, parliaments, public authorities, and the private sector to tackle policy, economic, and structural weaknesses that originate outside the control or influence of central banks. In order to contribute to sustainable economic growth, the report presumes that all other actors fulfill their responsibilities.
Roughly translated… central bankers are saying “you are now on your own.”
Central banks alone cannot be relied upon to deliver all the policies necessary to achieve macroeconomic goals. Governments must also act and use the policy-making space provided by conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures. Failure to do so would be a serious error and would risk setting the stage for further economic disturbances and imbalances in the future.
And the “need to exit” appears to be front and center for The G30 bankers…
There seems to be an almost unanimous view that monetary policy in the major AMEs will have to be normalized at some point. However, even if views differ about what precisely normal might mean, presumed dates for exit also differ due to different countries being at different points in the business cycle. There is also agreement that a danger exists of exiting too soon, thus aborting a nascent recovery, and also of exiting too late, thus encouraging some combination of higher inflation and other imbalances that could also weigh on recovery.
However, where serious disagreement arises is when it comes to discussing which danger is the greater. Those worried about too early an exit point to the example of the Federal Reserve in 1937. In contrast, those worried about too late an exit point to the inflation that followed the Fed-Treasury Accord in the late 1940s and to the inflationary surge in the early part of the 1970s.
In recent years, distortions in financial markets and the effects on EMEs have also moved much higher up the list of concerns of this latter group.
While reasonable people can disagree on such objective issues, a number of political economy factors seem to make exiting too late the more likely outcome.
First, there is great uncertainty concerning the consequences of tightening.
Second, in some cases it will in fact be clear that tightening will reveal some debts as being unserviceable, and some financial institutions as undercapitalized. Central banks will then be asked to wait until these other sectors have become more robust, which could well take a long time. The danger is that debt levels will rise with the passage of time, strengthening the arguments for still more forbearance—the debt trap discussed above.
Third, debtors will obviously resist the tightening of policy.Since governments are struggling to manage record-high sovereign debt levels, they too will be tempted to put pressure on their central banks to push back tightening as far as possible.
But delaying an ‘exit’ has costs…
Wicksell, Hayek, Koo, Minsky, and others have, over many decades, identified a variety of theoretical concerns arising from the excessive expansion of money and credit during booms. Rising inflation, investment misallocations, balance sheet overhangs, banking sector instability, and volatile international capital flows were all highlighted as threats to future economic stability. Moreover, by 2007 it was evident that these were matters of practical concern as well.
The policies followed by the major central banks since 2008, while contributing to stability in the short run and conceivably avoiding a second great depression, might also have aggravated threats to future stability. These policies have had undesirable macroeconomic side effects both in the AMEs themselves and in EMEs. Admittedly, in the latter case, the policy responses of the EMEs themselves to inflows of foreign capital have also played a contributing role.
“Capital losses would affect many investors, including banks, and the process of extend and pretend for poor loans would have to come to a stop,” the G30 report said.
With the consequences of an exit from easy money so unpredictable, the G30 said the risk was of exiting too late for fear of sparking another crisis.
And so, while ‘exit’ is seen as urgent, it is unlikely…
“Faced with uncertainty, the natural default position is the status quo,” the G30 said.
In other words more of the same… and while The G30 are careful to note the glass-half-full persepctive of the future, their “endgame” scenario of continuing weak (or even weaker) growth is troubling…
Should the global economy stay weak, or indeed should it weaken again as financial markets overshoot, we could face the possibility of debt deflation. The almost 40 percent decline in commodity prices since mid-2014 could be a precursor of such a slowdown. In this environment, risk-free rates would stay very low and there would be no exit for monetary policy.
Nevertheless, the current prices of many other financial assets would be revealed as excessive. Capital losses would affect many investors, including banks, and the process of extend and pretend for poor loans would have to come to a stop. In this scenario, for all the political economy arguments presented above, attempts might nevertheless be made to rely on monetary policy to restore demand. However, just as past efforts have failed to gain traction, renewed efforts would likely have a similar outcome. This would be particularly likely if the overhang of debt had worsened in the interval as has indeed happened over the last few years.
In such circumstances, governments would also be faced with chronic revenue shortfalls. This could lead to a worst-case situation where deflation would actually sow the seeds for an uncontrolled inflationary outcome. Governments with both large deficits and large debts must borrow to survive, but worries about debt accumulation might imply an increasing reluctance on the part of the private sector to lend to them at sustainable rates. In that case, recourse to the central bank is inevitable, and hyperinflation often the final result.
And the side effects of central bank policies during the crisis is still more worrying…
Central banks see their actions as buying time for governments to address problems that are essentially real, not monetary. However, governments have thus far not reacted as necessary. Recognizing the political difficulties of addressing these underlying problems, they prefer to believe that central bank actions will be sufficient to restore strong, stable, and balanced growth. Thus, they are strongly tempted to forebear in the pursuit of policies that might be more effective. The longer this standoff persists, the more dangerous it becomes as the undesirable side effects of current central bank policies continue to cumulate.
Which is exactly what Macquarie hinted at… the academics will be the first to note that policy escalation may be required (helicopter money).. and then policy-makers have the ivory tower to lean on when they unleash it.
Finally, The G30 admits – it’s all an illusion…
Central bank policies since the outbreak of the crisis have made a crucial contribution to restoring the appearance of financial stability.
Nevertheless, for this appearance to become a reality, underlying problems rooted in very high debt levels must be resolved if global growth is to be more sustainably restored.
So, the bottom line, reading between the lines of this 80-page report, is that
Central Bankers know their policies have done (and will do) nothing to promote real economic improvements, are putting pressure on governments to do something (anything), admit that is unlikely (because the central bankers have always saved them before), expect extreme policy measures to become the status quo (despite admitting their failure) for fear of any asset weakness, and suggest more measures might be needed (which have led to hyperinflation in the past).
But apart from that – everything is awesome!!
Monday, June 25, 2012
Germany rebuffs Obama's advice on euro crisis
BERLIN (AP) -- Germany's finance minister is rejecting U.S. President Barack Obama's calls on Europe to move faster in fighting its debt crisis, telling him to get the American deficit under control instead.
Wolfgang Schaeuble told public broadcaster ZDF in an interview late Sunday that "people are always very quick at giving others advice."
He says: "Mr. Obama should first of all take care of reducing the American deficit, which is higher than in the eurozone."
Obama and other leaders fear an escalating crisis in Europe could drag down the world economy.
The 17-nation eurozone is struggling to overhaul its institutions and streamline its decision making to restore investors' confidence. The bloc's debt relative to its economic output stands at about 80 percent, while it is about 100 percent in the U.S.
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